Russian Army in Ukraine Undergoing Major Command Shake-Up, Sources Say – Opinion

In Western military doctrine, there are a series of axioms called “the Principles of War.” They vary slightly from country to country; in the US military, they are Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity.

They are usually obvious, but if you don’t make an effort to stick to them, then they can be violated with often dire consequences. My opinion is that we were unable to achieve an objective through military force, which led to the deployment of 20 years of goat rope.

These principles were all violated by the Russians, except Objective and Offensive. The Russians lost all their numerical advantages by attacking four axes which were not able to support each other. In order to maneuver, Terrain used a lack of training and drove down the road single-file into predetermined positions. Russian officers spoke on unsecured phone lines about their battle plans. It was too complicated, and it assumed that the majority of the Ukrainian Army wouldn’t fight.

However, Unity of Command was not achieved. This is the biggest failure. The failure to achieve Unity of Command in the first phase was the biggest failing. In fact, there were three generals who ruled over ground combat. You would be surprised to learn that each Russian Air Force or Navy had its own commanders. As a result, the Russians’ overwhelming force was not used to maximize that advantage.

In early April, Putin attempted to remedy the command issues when he installed the commander of Russia’s Southern Military District, General Aleksandr Dvornikov, as commander of the entire “special military operation.” Dvornikov’s appointment was made based on three readily apparent factors. Dvornikov was also the highest ranking of all the military generals who were involved in the operation. He was widely considered the successor apparent to the Chief of the General Staff, Russian Armed Forces Forces. He would be able to avoid seniority. Dvornikov also commanded Russian forces during the war in Syria. His reputation included allowing Russian soldiers to use brutality and supporting various factions of military that were operating independently. Finally, the offensive efforts by the Southern Military District were viewed as the most successful part of Putin’s War in Ukraine.

Three weeks after his appointment, Gerasimov has proven to be no heir to Zhukov or Vasilevsky. As I detailed yesterday, the Russian Army still hasn’t come to grips with the problem of focusing their increasingly battered forces in one area. There are too many tasks for troops. And time is running out for the Russian Army as the Ukrainian Army becomes more capable and better equipped each day; read 10 Days Into Putin’s ‘New Phase’ of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, There Are Minor Advances but the Clock Is Ticking.

Now there are rumors of a significant shake-up in the conduct of Putin’s War and the command structure in the field.

According to the first rumor, Vladimir Putin (Russian President) is taking control of strategic planning for war.

👀

A senior EU source tells me: “Putin has now taken day-to day-control of the conflict and delegated the running of Russia to the Prime Minister”

— Mujtaba (Mij) Rahman (@Mij_Europe) April 29, 2022

Putin appears to have resigned from the ‘running Russia’ role so that he could concentrate on causing global chaos. He has allegedly taken personal control of the Army.https://t.co/nbylae0R0R

— Dave Troy 🌻 (@davetroy) April 29, 2022

Although I am unsure if anyone other than the Kremlin could confirm this, it is possible. The war is no longer a Tartar slave raid; it is a war that will largely determine Russia’s future. My gut is that it will definitely determine Vladimir Putin’s future because he has built an image as the man who will restore Russia to its former greatness. He must lead the country as both the leader and the one who has to deal with the political and economic consequences. He can’t be seen to lose in Ukraine, and his ego tells him that he can win this if he devotes his full attention to the war.

Another rumored shift is the fact that Valery Gerasimov (the aforementioned Chief General Staff of Russian Armed Forces, and First Deputy Defense Minister) has been given the order to assume personal command. No one knows if this means the “Butcher of Syria” Dvornikov has been relieved, is now functioning as a deputy to Gerasimov or is still in command with his boss watching his every move from close range. The same goes for the “Butcher of Syria” Dvornikov. No one knows how it makes matters better.

Putin’s military chief General Valery Gerasimov has been sent “towards” the Ukraine eastern front to try to inject some Russian momentum. (Note: unconfirmed) https://t.co/G7BK4CJ33w

— JeremyReesnz (@JeremyReesnz) April 29, 2022

This analysis is by Mick Ryan, a retired Australian Major General.

Today marks 64 days since Russia invaded Ukraine. Today, an examination of the implications of Gerasimov ‘taking charge’ of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

2/20 Unconfirmed reports suggest that General Gerasimov may have moved to Ukraine in order to assume overall command of Russia’s campaign. It is still speculation. Let’s use this thread to experiment with ideas.

General Gerasimov (Chairman of the General Staff, Russian Armed Forces) is on the 20th of November 2012. In November 2012, President Putin appointed him to the position.

4/20 How is Russia’s chief military commander taking control of what is in essence a theater command? It would represent a major intervention by Putin and it may lead to changes in Russian operations.

5/20 It is very unusual for the most senior military leader of a nation to ‘step down’ and assume an operational command. It’s a signal that Putin runs out of options in his Ukraine special operations. These are not the only interesting operational and strategic impacts.

6/20 Strategic Impacts He will be replaced by whom? Gerasimov led reforms of the Russian army for over a decade. His responsibilities include the management of the military’s day-to-day operations, which includes strategic forces. This is a difficult position to hold for too long.

7/20 Gerasimov leaves for Ukraine. No one will replace him.

8/20 Will this mean that Russian military strategy will change, or worsen? Despite the mythic status of Gerasimov before the war, the performance of the Russian military he oversees – strategic to tactical – has been quite sub-par.

9/20 And not only has it been ineffective on the battlefield, but the atrocities also it has committed – city destruction, deliberate targeting of civilians, torture and murder – are indicative of a corrupt professional ethos. Gerasimov is ultimately to blame for all of this.

10/20 Finally, what does this mean about Putin’s mindset? What does this mean for Putin’s mindset?

11/20 On the 20th of September 1942, General MacArthur directed Robert Eichelberger (US Army General) to head US forces at Buna. Before departing, Eichelberger was told “Bob, I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive.” Has Gerasimov been given a similar directive by Putin?

12/20 Oder have Putin and Defense Minister Shoigu appointed Gerasimov to be the fallen man for Russian incompetences during the war?

13/20 Operational impact. It appears, if Gerasimov’s appointment is confirmed, to place General Dvornikov’s appointment in a new light. Gerasimov may be appointed the overall commander with Dvornikov taking over the position of land commander.

14/20 Maybe General Dvornikov is not the skilled joint commander that Russia expected, or hasn’t met the timelines set for strategic success.

15/20 Gerasimov has a reputation as a military theorist. Gerasimov’s ideas have yet to be proved on the Ukrainian battlefield, but it is possible that his work could bring a higher level of planning and execution for Russian operations. This is a possibility.

16/20 Gerasimov will need to have a team of joint planners in order to do so. To be able to have real control over Russian operations within Ukraine, Gerasimov will need more than two command vehicles, an assistant-de-camp, and secure satellite phones.

17/20 The best generals are usually found at two locations on the battlefield. They’re the ones that face the most danger or offer the most opportunities. This is so that they are able to marshal the resources necessary to assist the commander on ground and provide leadership.

18/20 Gerasimov would be going to the Russian Army’s place of most danger & opportunity. Most dangerous because a loss in the east would probably see a long pause in operations for the Russians to regenerate forces & rethink strategy. It would be a major political blow for Putin.

It is also the most promising location for Russia, as it has the best chance to make an operational breakthrough and tell its citizens (and international friends) about the Russian military’s success in Ukraine.

20/20 Gerasimov used to be considered as one the most important Russian theorists during the current era. But his reforms didn’t result in any battlefield successes. His presence at the frontline, as commander of a Russian military force that is tactically weak, won’t change anything.

Eliot Cohen is a political science professor who has been a fixture in the GOP Establishment’s foreign policy. He offers some insight into what this move might mean in terms of politics.

There are two options if it’s true that General Gerasimov will assume direct command over combat operations in Ukraine via a forward headquarters. 1/6

First, the Russians want the best field commanders to execute the heroic tasks of organizing fire, maneuver and land-air and sea, as they launch decisive maneuvers. And obviously, he’s the best! 2/6

Second, he may not be the same Suvorov or Zhukov. But he has held the highest staff position for more than a decade. It’s not looking good. Perhaps very seriously. Or, at the very least, potentially very seriously. 3/6

The Boss can be blamed for launching this stupid war, which will weaken Russia and isolate it, while putting a bigger, more powerful NATO right at Russia’s doorstep. This is especially true if they lose it to the Ukrainian peasants. 4/6

So you send the Chief of the General Staff to the front with the message, “Fix this or don’t come home.” You now have a really good person to blame (nobody has ever heard of Dvornikov anyway). And at this point, you’re not worried about a successful general launching a coup. 5/6

…because this thing may be an epic disaster. This is why you will need an excellent scapegoat. Truth may lie somewhere between. But #2 is my bet. There is no reason to believe Gerasimov will be skilled as a theater commander, plus the issues @WarintheFuture mentions. 6/6

Final thoughts.

As of writing, both of these stories have not been confirmed. Both stories are believable in the context of the political and military mess Putin’s War has become. Both moves are not a sign that a leader is confident.